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This article explores Russia’s role in Northeast Asian energy security.  Energy 
cooperative efforts between Russia and its neighboring states are deeply rooted in 
Northeast Asia’s traditional and imperative energy demand and security issues.  
Specifically, the Sakhalin gas project, Kovykta gas, and Trans Siberian oil pipeline project 
illustrate both how seriously Russia and Northeast Asian states cope with their energy 
security concerns, and the potential for active energy trades in the region. This article 
analyzes the progress and the problems of this multilateral cooperative energy scheme 
within the framework of energy security. 
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Introduction 
 
This article deals with Russia’s role in Northeast Asian energy security.  Energy cooperative 
efforts between Russia and its neighboring states are deeply rooted in Northeast Asia’s traditional 
and imperative energy demand and security issues.  Specifically, the Sakhalin gas project, 
Kovykta gas, and Trans Siberian oil pipeline project show both how seriously Russia and 
Northeast Asian states cope with their energy security issues, and the potential for active energy 
trades.  
  
Russian-Northeast Asian energy relations are complementary in that several ongoing energy 
projects in the Russian Far East help Russia become a potential regional player in the Northeast 
Asian community, and that they also help each Northeast Asian states solve their own domestic 
energy shortage problem by diversifying its existing energy market.   
 
This article intends to bring to light the energy security concept in the region, while analyzing 
how this multilateral cooperative energy scheme can contribute to building a new regional 
economic security.  Energy projects, as part of the regional economic security building process, 
enhance economic security in the region, while promoting regional economic integration in 
Northeast Asia.   Accordingly, this chapter concludes that possible energy diplomacy issues 
must be dealt with within multi cooperative framework considerations, which also include China, 
Japan and North Korea.  
This article begins with the concept of energy security and its meaning for Northeast Asian 
region.  Then it explains the overall energy situation in Northeast Asia and Russia’s approach to 
Northeast Asian energy security.  It also assesses Russia’s energy export potential in the Russian 
Far East focusing on the Kovykta and Sakhalin gas projects, examining the possibility of Russia’s 
role as an energy provider to Northeast Asian countries.  The final section of this paper 
explores problems of energy security in Northeast Asia.   
 
 
1. The concept of Energy Security 
 
Energy security is an important element of bilateral and regional economic security today.  It is a 
strategic factor in ensuring the economic development and stability of states.  Because of the 
“increasing importance of traded energy, increasing dependence on Middle East Oil, no sign of 
slackening demand rise, continuing volatility of oil prices, and environmental and sustainability 
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concerns,” 1  energy issues are an increasingly important part of the security agenda in 
international relations in general.       
 
Energy security is defined as the securing of reliable and affordable energy supplies that are 
sufficient to support social, economic, and military needs, while at the same time being 
environmentally sustainable. 2   More specifically, “in a state which enjoys energy security 
consumers and their governments are able to believe that there are adequate reserves from 
sources at home or abroad, and production and distribution facilities available to meet their 
requirements in the near future, at costs that do not put them at a competitive disadvantage or 
otherwise threaten their well-being.”3  In other words, energy security requires the ability to 
obtain reliable supplies of essential natural resources at affordable prices.4  Energy insecurity 
arises when the welfare of citizens or the ability of governments to pursue their other normal 
objectives are threatened, either as a result of physical failure of supplies or as a result of sudden 
and major price changes.5  In this sense, it can be argued that energy security constitutes an 
important part of economic security because it is the core prerequisite for sustainable 
development.6   
 
One way to estimate the level of energy security is to measure the extent to which a country is 
dependent on particular types of energy and whether these can be obtained within its territory or 
must be imported.  In the latter case, a second question emerges relating to the level of the 
dependency, the diversity of foreign sources, the relative vulnerability of the source areas to 
political turmoil, and hostile control.  Similar questions apply to transportation routes and 
carrying systems.  In the end, the energy security of a state is evaluated by its level of self 
                                                   
1
 Philip Andrews-Speed, “Energy Security in East Asia: A European View,” presentation material at the Symposium 
on Pacific Energy Cooperation 2003, Tokyo, 12-13 February, 2003. 
2
 Hyun Jae Doh, Perspectives and Measures for Energy Security in the 21st Century, Abstract, published for Korea 
Energy Economics Institute, December 2003.  Willrich defines energy security as, first, the guarantee of sufficient 
energy supplies to permit a country to function during a war; and second, and more broadly, the assurance of adequate 
energy supplies to maintain the national economy at normal levels. He argues that the first definition is too restrictive, 
and the second too permissive and expansive.  Therefore, he proposes that for most purposes, the definition of energy 
security as the securing of reliable and affordable energy supplies that are sufficient to support social, economic, and 
military needs, while at the same time being environmentally sustainable is the most plausible approach.  See Mason 
Willrich, Energy and World Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 66. 
3
 Robert Belgrave, Charles K. Ebinger and Hideaki Okino ed., Energy Security to 2000 (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1987) p. 2. 
4
 Robert J. Lieber, “Energy, Economics and Security in Alliance Perspective,” International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4, 
Spring 1980, p. 141, and for a more detailed discussion and definition, see also David Deese, “Energy: Economics, 
Politics, and Security,” International Security, Vol. 4 No. 3, Winter 1979/80, pp. 140-142.  
5
 Belgrave, Ebinger and Okino, p. 2. 
6
 Doh. 
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sufficiency and its ability to adapt to temporary and prolonged supply interruptions without 
serious economic and military consequences.7 
 
A useful distinction can be made between energy importing and exporting countries.  An 
importing country is primarily concerned with the security of its energy supplies.  However, 
each importing country tends to view foreign energy supplies as more or less vulnerable to 
interruption. 8   Although interruptions, disruptions, and manipulations of existing supply 
arrangements can be caused by accidents and natural disasters, they are more vulnerable to 
potential political instability, economic coercion, military conflict, and terrorist acts.9  These 
concerns apply not only to the source of energy supplies but also to the routes and means by 
which they are transported.10   
 
Energy exporters, on the other hand, are preoccupied with access to markets and security of 
demand.  An exporting country may view energy security as national sovereignty over its energy 
resources, or it may view it more broadly as sovereignty over resources plus guaranteed access to 
foreign markets.11  Moreover, an exporter may view security as sovereignty plus market access 
plus financial security for the assets it receives in exchange for energy raw materials.  An 
exporter may adopt, as a result of sovereignty over its basic raw materials, a concept of energy 
security that includes guaranteed access to foreign markets.  In short, demand security may be as 
important to energy exporters as supply security is to importers.  As Willrich notes,  
 
This raises possibilities for mutually beneficial negotiations between exporters and 
importers, based on overlapping areas of interest in stability and equilibrium. In addition 
to sovereignty and market access, an exporter may extend the concept of energy security 
to cover financial security for the investments made with its export earnings.  This 
scenario may seem exaggerated but energy resources below ground are a precious 
national heritage.  Once extracted, that heritage can easily be lost by an improvident 
government or eroded by inflation.12   
 
 
                                                   
7
 Paul B. Stares, “Introduction and Overview,” in Paul B. Stares, ed., Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia (Tokyo: 
Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), p. 22. 
8
 Willrich, p. 66 
9
 See both Daniel Yergin, “Energy Security in the 1990s,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 1, 1988, pp. 111-132; and 
Stares, p. 22. 
10
 Stares, p. 22. 
11
 Willrich, p. 94. 
12
 Ibid., p. 95. 
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2. Northeast Asian and Russian approach toward Energy Security 
 
In Northeast Asia, new security concerns are emerging with regard to energy use, energy security, 
and the sustainability of economic growth.  At present, China, Japan, and the two Koreas are 
desperately searching for economically rational, diversified, and reliable supplies to support their 
energy needs.  Russian oil and natural gas in the Far East region represents a potential new 
source of supply to the Northeast Asian states, providing them with the opportunity to diversify 
their energy supplies both geographically and in terms of energy mix, thereby promoting 
competition and protecting the environment.13  In particular, Russia’s natural gas could provide 
an alternative to coal and oil for power generation.  As a fuel, it is cleaner than oil and coal, 
since it produces no sulphuric discharges and much less carbon dioxide.14  Thus the oil and 
natural gas pipeline projects on which Russia is currently engaged in Northeast Asia have great 
strategic importance for enhancing not only Russia’s economic security, but also that of South 
Korea, and of Northeast Asia as a whole.  Regional energy cooperation would facilitate a 
reconfiguration of political and economic ties, with Russia moving into a position of advantage.   
 
From the Russian energy security perspective, Russia’s reemergence as an energy power heralds 
an important change in international energy security structure in the early new century.  Its 
strengthening of energy diplomacy has impacted on world energy markets and international 
strategic stability.15  Energy is a powerful force for creating a foreign policy agenda in Russian 
foreign policy.  Because of the capacity of energy interest to bring desperately needed hard 
currency into the Russian economy and the sectors’ already established ties within both the 
international system and the Russian government, the oil and gas conglomerate is a powerful 
force in today’s Russian foreign policy.  At the same time, the Russian government is itself using 
the issue of energy to achieve particular foreign policy goals within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Europe, Middle East, and possibly in Northeast Asia too. 
 
Russian foreign policy goals in the energy sector include attracting foreign investment to help 
stabilize and develop Russian energy resources, increasing Russian investment in foreign 
exploration and development projects, and providing various services for Russia’s foreign energy 
sectors.  Ivanov suggests that Russian energy diplomacy generally tends to envisage three broad 
                                                   
13
 Vladimir I. Ivanov and Mitsuru Hamada, Energy Security and Sustainable Development in Northeast Asia: 
Prospects for U.S.-Japan Coordination, Article for Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, Niigata, Japan, p. 
6, on http://gsti.miis.edu/CEAS-PUB/200013Ivanov-Hamada.pdf, accessed on 4 December, 2004. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Feng Yujun, Ding Xiaoxing and Li Dong, “Russia’s New Energy Diplomacy and Its Impact,” Contemporary 
International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 10, October 2002, p. 14. 
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areas of activity: bilateral and multilateral relations with other countries, participation in 
international organizations, and selective cooperation with transnational corporations. 16  
President Putin, in particular, views energy diplomacy as an important means to promote 
economic recovery, to participate in the world economic system, to maintain Russia’s geo-
strategic influence and to improve the international environment. 17    From the Russian 
perspective, energy diplomacy represents a tool to restore Russia’s international status.  But 
justifying the development of vast sources of energy is difficult without linking feasibility 
assessments to large neighboring markets and investment funds from external sources.  In the 
past, the Russian gas sector has put great emphasis on its European markets and has been 
meticulous about maintaining Russia’s image as a reliable partner of the West.   
 
In this regard, the export of oil and natural gas resources to its Northeast Asian neighbors 
constitutes a potentially important engine for Russia’s economic development and foreign policy 
goals.  Improving relations with Northeast Asian countries in energy resource development 
might be a realistic way to secure capital investment and credits from the interested Northeast 
Asian governments and private sectors, and from the international financial institutions in the 
future.18  In particular, Russia’s export of energy could facilitate the investment of Japanese and 
South Korean capital and technology in Russia’s oil and gas sector.19  As far as South Korea is 
concerned, access to Kovykta and Sakhalin oil and natural gas is crucial for enhancing its 
economic security, given that the demand for oil is increasing steeply, as is the dependence on 
overseas sources.  The CIA lists South Korea as the world’s fourth largest oil importing country 
after the USA, Japan, and Germany.20  South Korea has a vested interest in diversifying its 
energy supply sources, and its proximity to the Russian Far East would lead to a drop in the cost 
of transporting energy sources. 
 
 
                                                   
16
 Vladimir I. Ivanov, The Energy Sector in Northeast Asia  New Projects, Delivery Systems, and Prospects for Co-
operation  North Pacific Policy Papers 2 (Vancouver: Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies, Institute of Asian 
Research, University of British Columbia, 2000), p. 32. 
17
 Feng, Ding and Li, p. 1. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “Russia, Energy and the West,” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2, Summer 2001, 
p. 143. 
20
 See The CIA World fact book, Global oil consumption and production, www.MarkTaw.com, on 
http://www.marktaw.com/culture_and_media/politics/GlobalOil.html, accessed on 20 April, 2005. 
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3. Current Energy situation in Northeast Asia 
3. 1 Energy demand and consumption in Northeast Asia 
 
Northeast Asia has been one of the fastest growing energy markets over the past 30 years.  The 
end of the Cold War has brought positive political changes in Northeast Asia, and the opening of 
the Chinese and Russian economies has also enhanced multilateral economic cooperation.  In 
particular, the importance of energy security, primarily the energy demand issue in the region has 
risen rapidly in recent years, as a result of population and income growth, and this trend will 
persist in the foreseeable future at a higher rate than in other parts of the world.  Accordingly, 
the energy sectors continue to change rapidly in response to issues such as increasing demand, 
resource availability, environmental concerns, changing technology and the need for regulatory 
reform, and sector restructuring that will attract investment capital to fund supply 
infrastructure.21     
 
Currently, the majority of Northeast Asian oil imports come from the Middle East.  This Asian 
dependence on imports from the Middle East is expected to increase in the future.  Long term 
projections for China’s economic growth, the possible unification of Korea, and energy 
consumption all lead Northeast Asian countries to consider that diversification of their energy 
supplies is inevitable.  In this regard, development of energy projects in Central Asia and the 
Russian Far East provide Northeast Asian states with good options for securing their energy.   
In particular, the potential for extensive environmental deterioration caused by coal burning in 
China promotes the incentive to look at nearer and more competitive sources of natural gas in 
the Russian Far East.  Regional demand for this efficient, plentiful, and clean-burning fuel is 
substantially increasing the momentum to produce, trade, and utilize natural gas.  The demand 
for cross-border sale and purchase by both pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) ship is 
spreading in the region.22  For example, demand for natural gas has been rising at 9.3% per year 
since 1970 in this region.23  Northeast Asia is a net importer of gas, and imports could 
potentially increase sharply in the 2010-20 period.24  For example, three countries in the Pacific 
                                                   
21
 APEC ENERGY DEMAND AND SUPPLY OUTLOOK 2002, Asia Pacific Energy Research Center, Tokyo, Japan 
2002,  p. 1. 
22
 Peter Ross, “Gas Pricing,” Workshop by Director, Wimbledon Energy for 11th Annual Seminar on Gas Pricing at 
Kuala Lumpur, 8-10, December 2003. 
23
 This has not only been a product of the rapid economic development of the region, but also due to a desire to 
diversify away from oil following the shocks in the 1970s and growing appreciation of the economic and 
environmental benefits of natural gas.  See Peter Cleary, “Development of East Siberian Gas for Export to China and 
Korea Markets,” Presentation by President, BP Gas Power & Renewables Korea for Sakhalin & North Asia Oil, Gas & 
Pipelines 2003,  Seoul, Korea, 12-13 November, 2003. 
24
 APEC ENERGY DEMAND AND SUPPLY OUTLOOK 2002, Asia Pacific Energy Research Center, Tokyo Japan 
2002, p. 5.    
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Basin – Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan – accounted for 68 percent of global LNG imports in 
2002.25  Many experts also predict that the growth of the demand for gas will be particularly 
strong in China and Korea.26  In Korea, for example, demand for natural gas will double, 
increasing from 25bm³/in 2003 to almost 50bm³/by 2020, whereas demand in China is forecast 
to increase five fold from 30bm³/ in 2003 to more than 160bm³/by 2020.27  In Korea, 
moreover, natural gas and heat consumption is expected to increase almost 2.5 fold over the 
forecast period, while oil which is at present the main fuel used in Korea, is expected to decline 
to 20 percent in 2020 from 47 percent in 1999.28  
 
It is important to question, however, whether and how this increasing demand should be met.  
It is estimated that gas reserves and undiscovered resources will be sufficient to meet the 
consumption needs.29  The International Center for Information on Natural Gas (CEDIGAZ)30 
indicates that natural gas reserves and resources are approximately four times the cumulative 
world consumption forecast until 2020.31  This means that a huge volume of natural gas has yet 
to be discovered.32    
 
In this regard, Russia, as the world’s No. 1 natural gas and No. 2 oil exporting country, becomes 
an energy solution for Northeast Asian countries.  Although natural gas reserves are distributed 
more evenly across regions than oil, the majority are located in the former Soviet Union and the 
Middle East, which have 72 percent of total remaining reserves.  There are also reports that of 
undiscovered resources, 50 percent are expected to be in those same regions.33 And yet, Russia 
currently exports almost all of its gas to non-Asian economies, along with oil mainly to Europe 
for the most part due to the lack of hydrocarbons transportation infrastructure in Northeast 
Asia.34  In order to meet growing demand for natural gas, infrastructure development requiring 
                                                   
25
 “Global Liquefied Natural Gas Markets: Status and Outlook/ LNG Importers,” Energy Information Administration 
(EIA),on http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/global/importers.html, accessed on 9 September, 2005. 
26
 Cleary. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 APEC, p. 42. 
29
 Ibid., p. 64 and BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2001. 
30
 Paris-base gas industry information agency 
31
 For example, the mean estimate of worldwide undiscovered natural gas is 147.1 trillion m³.  An even larger 
quantity of natural gas resources, ultimate remaining gas, is estimated at 450 to 530 trillion m³ by CEDIGAZ.  See 
International Center for Information on Natural Gas (Paris-base gas industry information agency)(CEDIGAZ), Natural 
Gas in the World: 2001 Survey. 
32
 U.S. Geological Survey, World petroleum Assessment 2000, Washington, DC., 2000, quoted in International 
Energy Agency (IEA)(2000) and Energy Information Administration (EIA).   
33
 APEC, p. 64. 
34
 Konstantin V. Simonov, “Projects of Eastern Siberia Development,” Speeches by Deputy Director, The Center for 
Current Politics in Russia for International Seminar on Policies and Strategies toward Korea-Russia Energy 
Cooperation, Vladivostok, 7 October, 2003. 
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massive investment such as transport either by pipeline or as LNG and distribution networks for 
industrial and residential use is crucial.35  
3. 2 The development of Natural Gas in Northeast Asia 
3. 2. 1 LNG Facilities 
 
In Northeast Asia, there are relatively well-developed facilities for reception, re-gasification, and 
distribution of LNG.  This is particularly the case in Korea and Japan, which are heavily 
dependent on imported LNG supply.  As demand for natural gas will continue to grow, more 
LNG facilities are planned.  For example, it is reported that in Japan new storage tanks capable 
of holding 3.8 million m³ of LNG are to be built by 2006, and Korea is planning to build 
additional capacity for 3.7 million m³ by 2010.36  Securing shipping and LNG terminal capacity 
are essential to key success in the oversupplied market, and particularly to the growing short-term 
and spot trades.37  It appears that the LNG market, though not so structured as others at 
present, has begun developing into a spot delivery market.  And although slower than in the 
Atlantic, spot LNG trade is expected to grow rapidly in the Asia-Pacific market, with the majority 
of gas trade still anchored on long term contracts.  As major LNG importing economies such as 
Japan and Korea move forward to competitive national markets for power and gas, LNG trading 
patterns will respond to buyers’ changing needs in risk management by allowing more flexibility 
in gas purchases.38 
3. 2. 2 Pipeline natural gas 
 
Compared with well-developed trans-border transmission lines and local distribution networks in 
North America and Europe, the Northeast Asian regions lag far behind in the development of 
pipeline infrastructure.  The natural gas market in Asia is largely restricted to LNG.  However, 
since the end of the Cold War especially in the 2000s, international relations in Northeast Asia 
have changed dramatically and a serious plan is in the process of development for a natural gas 
pipeline connecting Japan, China, Korea, and possibly Mongolia and North Korea with Sakhalin 
and eastern Siberia.39  A great deal of investments have already been established or are being 
considered by major global oil companies including Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and BP, 
with the additional participation of Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and Russian private sectors.  For 
example, the Kovykta project, if completed, will be the largest single project in the world with an 
                                                   
35
 APEC., p. 51. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 APEC, p. 51 
38
 Ibid., p. 69. 
39
 Tsutomu Toichi, “Energy Security in Asia and Japanese Policy,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2003, p. 47. 
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estimated development cost of US$ 23 billion on the Russian side, and a feasibility study is still 
being carried out.  Another major project is the Sakhalin project that will supply gas and oil to 
Japan and Korea and potentially other Asia Pacific markets.40  Among the six Sakhalin projects, 
so far Sakhalin 1 and Sakhalin 2 have started substantial exploration and development. 
 
 
4. Putin’s role 
 
Russia has abundant natural energy resources, while possessing almost the largest of the world’s 
proven reserves of natural gas (33 percent of the world total), 4.7 percent of the world’s proven 
oil reserves and 16 percent of the world’s coal reserves.41  And the energy industry accounted 
for approximately 30% of the GDP. 42  Being more than self sufficient in all hydrocarbon fuels, 
Russia exports substantial volumes of natural gas and liquid hydrocarbons to areas outside the 
former Soviet Union.43  Oil and gas exports comprise 55 percent of total merchandise exports in 
2005.  For example, oil exports held up better than output throughout the 1990s, and in 2001 
Russia became the world's second-largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia.  According to RosStat 
figures, in 2004 Russia exported 56% (257m tonnes, or 5.2m b/d) of its crude oil exports.44  The 
relative weight of the energy sector in the national economy will be maintained in the next two 
decades. 
Russia’s energy policy goals largely include three elements: “1) to strengthen the positions of 
Russia in the international energy markets, 2) non discriminatory access to the international 
markets and advanced technologies, and 3) to stimulate foreign investment.”45  
 
In this sense, creation of a favorable investment climate for domestic and foreign investors is a 
prerequisite for this process.  The Russian Energy Strategy estimates investment needs in the 
order of US$ 40 to $70 billion over the period from 2001 to 2020.46   
  
                                                   
40
 APEC, p. 66. 
41
 Ibid., p. 211. 
42
 2005 Russian Report, The Korea Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank), 9 August, 2005. 
43
 Eugene M. Khartukov, “Russia,” in Paul B Stares, ed., Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia (Tokyo: Japan 
Center for International Exchange, 2000), p. 152. 
44
 “Russia: Business: Industry overview, Russia: Energy provision,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Views Wire, 
20 April, 2005, on http://www.viewswire.com/index.asp?layout=display_article&doc_id=488217648, accessed on 10 
September, 2005. 
45Alexey M. Mastepanov, “O perspektivah osvoeniya gazovuih resursov Vostochnoi Sibiri I Dalnego 
Vostoka,” Dokladuivaet: Zamestitil nachalnika Departamenta perspektivnogo razvitiya, nauki i ekologii. Gazprom. 
Presentation by Deputy Head, Gazprom for International Seminar on Policies and Strategies toward Korea-Russia 
Energy Cooperation, Vladivostok, 7 October 2003.  
46
 “Russian Energy Survey: 2002,” International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris, 2002. 
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Energy exports will be maintained at a considerably high level, especially in natural gas and liquid 
fuels, with special emphasis on petroleum products.  Energy exports can become more 
diversified through penetration of the energy markets of East Asia and increasing direct supply of 
oil and products to the United States.  In my opinion, it is important to understand that Russia 
is particularly interested in developing Eastern Siberia and Sakhalin natural gas fields due to 
Gazprom’s gas policy.  Whereas Russia's oil sector has become increasingly competitive since 
privatization in the early 1990s and the onset of consolidation after 2000, the gas sector continues 
to be dominated by the state-controlled gas giant Gazprom.  Although Gazprom controls one-
third of the world's natural gas reserves, it has not faced the kind of market pressures that have 
been behind the recovery in oil output.  Gas output peaked at 643bn cu meters in 1991 and fell 
gradually to stand at 561 cu meters in 2002. Gas output has been rising since then, reaching 
591bn cu meters in 2004, and the government plans to increase gas output to 950bn cu meters in 
2005, backed by US$4.5bn investment spending on prospecting and expansion.  Gazprom sold 
181bn cu meters (or 11.8% more) abroad in 2004, with a year-on-year rise of around 15% in 
exports to Europe, its largest and most lucrative export market.  Gazprom uses its export 
earnings to subsidize loss-incurring domestic sales, which earn around 20% of world market 
prices.  Since cheap gas powers much of Russia's industrial sector and keeps household energy 
bills low, the government has been reluctant to liberalize domestic gas prices.  This has starved 
Gazprom of the investment capital needed to replace its declining west Siberian fields with new 
ones in the far north and east, and to build new storage and transportation facilities.47 
 
Russia aims to increase oil export volume from 3 % to 30%, and gas export volume from 0% to 
15% in the future in the Asia Pacific region.48  Yet, the traditional European export direction 
will still be a priority.49  Given Russia’s geopolitical position and the existing transportation 
infrastructure, energy exports are still mostly designed for Europe and as such can only indirectly 
influence Northeast Asian energy markets.50  In the longer term, however, as a massive energy 
provider, Russia can still play a very important role in shaping cooperative energy schemes in 
Northeast Asia.  Several ongoing and planned energy projects in the Russian Far East and 
eastern Siberia enable Russia to increase supplies of its fuel and electricity to Northeast Asia.51     
                                                   
47
 Although the company has access to foreign borrowing to fund its capital expenditure, its investment plans are held 
back by high levels of debt and continued uncertainty about gas market reform.  The government hopes that the 
removal of the “ring-fence”—which limits foreign share ownership in the company—will finally allow Gazprom to 
raise much-needed investment capital.  See “Russia: Business: Industry overview, Russia: Energy provision,” 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Views Wire, 20 April, 2005, on 
http://www.viewswire.com/index.asp?layout=display_article&doc_id=488217648, accessed on 10 September, 2005. 
48
 Alexey M. Mastepanov’s presentation. 
49
 APEC, p. 215. 
50
 Khartukov, p. 152. 
51
 Ibid. 
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In fact, the Russian Far East (RFE) and East Siberia are emerging as potential new sources of 
energy for East Asian fuel markets.   The RFE has about 30 percent of Russia’s coal deposits, 
half of which can be mined in open pits.  Oil, natural gas and hydropower sites are abundant 
and widely dispersed, capable of both producing annual exports of crude oil to 15 million-25 
million tons (Mt),52 and providing 30 billion-50 billion cubic meters (bm³)53 of natural gas a year 
to neighboring Asia Pacific countries.54  East Siberia represents 20% of proven natural gas 
reserves in the world today.  For example, the natural gas supply potential from this basin in 
2020 could be as much as 130 billion cubic meters (bm³), which is equivalent to the level of 
Russian exports to Europe today.55  Moreover, over 3 million tons of oil was produced in 
Sakhalin in 2002.  And up to 45 million tons are forecast to be produced annually at Sakhalin 
after 30 years.  Oil production development in East Siberia and the Russian Far East would 
increase the production level up to 95 million tons of oil annually after 30 years.56  
 
So far, the most successful upstream developments in the Russian Far East at this stage are the 
Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 projects, which will be discussed in detail in the later part of this 
chapter.  Overall crude oil production levels for Sakhalin can be estimated at 0.7 million barrels 
per day (Mb/d) in 2020, with corresponding export volumes of about 0.5Mb/d.  Production 
figures for East Siberia can be estimated at 0.8 Mb/d in 2020 with probable export figures of 0.4 
Mb/d.  The eastern part of Russia as a whole could supply the Asia-Pacific market with up to 
0.9 Mb/d in 2020 under favorable pricing conditions.  Natural gas production is expected to 
start around 2010, though transport remains the main problem to be overcome.57  At the 
beginning of 2002 the state oil transport company Transneft announced a plan to build by 2008-
2010 a 3,765km oil pipeline on an Angarsk-Khabarovsk-Nakhodka route with a capacity of one 
Mb/d.  It should be filled with a great amount of oil from the West Siberian fields and new 
prospective deposits in East Siberia.58   
In short, the potential of the Russian Far East is not only likely to reshape energy flows in 
Northeast Asia but may also redefine the region’s geopolitical relationships.  Although Russia is 
quite often portrayed as a waning political and economic force in Asia Pacific these days, the 
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country cannot be simply ignored in the “new geopolitics of energy” because of its current 
enormous energy production and export potential.59  Russia’s geographic proximity to the 
Northeast Asian energy importers gives Russia a regional geopolitical position as a desirable 
alternative to the now dominant Middle East energy suppliers.  From the Korean perspective, as 
long as Russia’s natural gas projects in the region provide competitive terms and guarantee the 
stability of supply, Russia clearly emerges as a potential competitive energy supplier.60 
 
 
5. Obstacles 
 
Nevertheless, a number of problems and obstacles still hinder energy security cooperation in the 
region.  As Peter Cleary, President of BP Gas Power & Renewables Korea outlines, there are 
four major requirements to establish energy security cooperation in the region: “1) political will 
for regional cooperation, 2) the right partnership to deliver major projects, 3) enormous 
investment in infrastructure and supply, and 4) simulation of market development.”61  However, 
I would argue that Russian-Northeast Asian bilateral and multi-lateral energy security cooperation 
in the region has been delayed due to either the relative underdevelopment or the absence of the 
above mentioned four requirements as well as other factors such as the persisting problems of 
the Russian Far East and the Northeast Asian energy pattern.  
  
One of the main obstacles to energy security cooperation in the Northeast Asian region is the 
lack of confidence between Russia and the Northeast Asian states.  For example, the proposed 
Kovykta gas pipeline project remains uncertain because the Russian government has been 
indecisive about what route to choose and whether Kovytka gas should be used for export or for 
domestic purposes.  This makes it very difficult to bolster the confidence of Northeast Asian 
investors in the Russian government.62       
 
Moreover, concerns have been raised about the potential vulnerability of the extensive network 
of oil and gas pipelines that are either under development or still in the planning stage.63  As 
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Kent Calder notes, some pipelines are likely to pass through areas now considered to be 
politically volatile.  Besides the risk of short-term dislocations from terrorist attacks and other 
threats, the pipelines will also give the countries that host them the potentially vital leverage to 
disrupt or cut them entirely in crisis and war.64  For example, the unresolved North Korean 
nuclear issue as well as territorial disputes among Northeast Asian countries, such as the dispute 
over the Kuril Island, may interrupt supplies.  This makes creating an institutionalized 
multilateral energy cooperative structure necessary in Northeast Asia.  Moreover, I argue that 
Russia’s refusal to build the Kovykta gas pipeline project and its delayed oil pipeline route 
decision between China and Japan can be viewed as contributing to energy insecurity in the 
Northeast Asian region. 
 
Second, the development of the Kovykta and Sakhalin gas projects has been affected by general 
Russian-South Korean bilateral diplomatic relations and trilateral relations among Russia, North 
Korea, and South Korea, due to the complementary nature of economic structures.  For 
example, one of the possible Kovykta pipeline routes to pass through North Korean territory, 
suggested by the South Korean government in 2003, was ruled out primarily because of the 
unresolved North Korean nuclear crisis.   
 
It is important to understand that government industrial policies are essential for the market 
penetration of gas.  For example, several trans-border gas projects in the Russian Far East will 
never materialize unless they receive the active political support of all the nations involved.  The 
region’s energy security is closely associated with the security of international energy investment.65  
Governments set the rules and partly determine the costs and benefits of economic activities.66  
State authorized third-party access or open access to essential facilities such as LNG terminals, 
pipelines, and storage allows both suppliers and consumers easier access to the gas market.  This 
also facilitates the substitution of natural gas for other fuels.  Governments could also lead gas-
to-gas competition to increase, and thus force existing facilities to be used more efficiently and 
gas supply costs reduced.  Consequently, increased competition produces higher profits for 
facility owners, while inviting more participants to the market.67  However, though Putin and 
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Roh Moo Hyun showed some initiatives in 2003 at the government level, diplomatic relations 
between Moscow and Seoul have been stagnant without any special agenda from either side.  
 
Third, this minor economic activity is also explained by the following factors: cultural 
dissimilarity between the two countries, lack of information about Russia among South Koreans, 
and the absence of South Korean experts on the Russian economy has further slowed down the 
pace of energy cooperation between the two countries.  In Korea, in particular, energy 
specialists are virtually non-existent especially in resolving complex government-related issues 
and administrative litigation, with special emphasis on energy regulatory rule.  For example, 
South Korea’s recent Sakhalin oil scandal further illustrates its inexperience and lack of strategy in 
dealing with energy cooperation with the Russians.  On 30 April 2005, South Korean 
prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for a senior railway official in connection with a failed 
Russian oil deal which cost the state-run railroad agency millions of dollars.  Wang Young-yong, 
a director at state-run Korea Railroad, was suspected of pursuing the project without properly 
investigating its profitability.  In 2004, Korea Railroad had agreed to invest in an oil project on 
Russia’s Sakhalin Island, and paid a deposit of US $ 6.2 million to Russian investment group 
Alfa-Eco.  Yet, the Russian government later denied approval for the project, and the Korea 
Railroad withdrew from the contract.  In April 2005, Alfa-Eco announced that it would return 
only US $ 2.7 million to the Korea Railroad according to the terms of the agreed contract.  The 
Board of Audit and Inspections of Korea stated that the railroad agency incurred damage to the 
nation by jumping into the project without legal basis or survey of profitability, not to mention 
any appropriate internal decision making process.68  Although this incident did not happen 
because of government-to-government miscommunication, it is undeniable that it fueled general 
skepticisms toward the Russian energy infrastructure in the Russian Far East, among the Korean 
public and the private energy sectors.  Moreover, the financial crisis that Russia and South 
Korea both suffered almost at the same time during the late 1990s has also contributed to delay 
mutual energy cooperation between the two countries.69  
 
Fourth, protectionism in Russia, which is overwhelmingly new Russian natural resource 
nationalism is the most important barrier for establishment of energy security in the region.  
From the perspective of energy project host country, direct foreign investment is the key 
instrument in developing the project.  In fact, the export component of the Russian Far East’s 
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fuel and power balances is extremely sensitive to other Asian countries’ involvement in this 
region’s energy resource development.70  In this sense, the investment climate of the host 
country is crucial because the combination of taxes, tariffs, laws, and regulations determines the 
extent and speed of such investment flows.  An improved legislative and regulatory base in the 
energy sector promotes standardization, certification, and better licensing of energy market 
participants.71  However, changing legislation and an unstable tax regime pose additional barriers 
to the development of effective businesses.72  Putin failed to provide the legal and institutional 
infrastructure for external energy transactions for foreign energy companies.  Moreover, non- 
transparent procedure in the Russian bureaucracy created additional difficulties for economic 
cooperation with Russia.  
   
Specifically, institutional barriers such as Russia’s production sharing agreements concern 
investors.73  In the upstream operations of oil and natural gas, a production sharing agreement 
law is still under consideration in the Russian Parliament, and is subject to revisions.  Again, for 
long-term investment decisions, political risks are still high for foreign investors.74 Russia has not 
been particularly successful in energy price reform, nor has it made a dramatic improvement in 
corporate transparency and energy efficiency while ensuring proper safeguards against the diverse 
environmental effects of increased energy production and use.75  Russia’s regulatory reform has 
also been so slow that it has had disturbing impacts on energy supply.76   
 
The Kremlin has been reluctant to encourage foreign participation in the energy projects.  
Instead, Moscow has pursued Gazprom’s more involvement in every gas project.  For example, 
as the paused Kovykta project shows, “China and South Korea was highly concerned that the 
Kremlin had appointed Gazprom as coordinator of all gas projects in the country, making it 
unclear whether business negotiations should be held with RP or Gazprom.  And the situation 
was aggravated by the fact that the working groups had not met for almost six months.”77  
Moreover, Gazprom’s recent objection to developing the Kovykta project and its policy of 
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diverting foreign investors’ attention to the Sakhalin project also show that Kremlin leaders 
pursue nothing more than a protective nationalistic energy policy and simply seeks financial 
benefits.   
   
Fifth, the inherent problems of the Russian Far East also contribute to the delay of energy 
cooperation in the region.  Despite its sizable energy resources, it is undeniable that the Russian 
Far East is still facing a severe energy crisis because of an insufficient infrastructure and 
ineffective economic policies.  The lack of a land based transportation infrastructure connecting 
this region with the country’s major fuel sources in neighboring Siberia and distant European 
Russia means that only summer seaborne transportation is possible.78  Moreover, long haul 
deliveries of liquid and solid fuels are too costly because of high railroad tariffs and sea freight 
costs.  Even since perestroika, the Russian Far East has been considered Russia’s most vulnerable 
and least protected region in terms of energy supplies.79  This region has suffered serious 
depopulation, and the major southern cities often still experience cutoffs of electricity and hot 
water during winter.80  For example, since 1991, the region lost nearly 1 million of its estimated 
8 million inhabitants.81  And the exceptionally high price of energy bills meant pit managers 
could not afford to pay their workers.  In August 1996, coal miners protesting wage arrears 
staged hunger strikes that shut down the Primorskugol mines.82 
 
Most of all, harsh environmental conditions hinder the development of the region’s energy 
resources.  Climatic and operating conditions in these regions are extremely tough.  From 
October to June, these conditions are characterized by an ice cover exceeding 2 meters (m), 
icebergs up to 20-m thick, frequent typhoons, currents with widely varying directions, and low air 
temperatures.  Field development under such conditions would require technologically 
advanced and capital intensive ice resistant fixed platforms for drilling and production and 
underwater pipelines protected against icebergs. 83   It is important to point out that 
environmental challenges in the region often create an unexpectedly wide gap between the initial 
feasibility study and the later actual process, in terms of project cost.  For example, in July 2005 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Executives at the Sakhalin-2 project said that the project could cost US $ 20 
billion, twice as much as expected, partly because of the overruns and delays to going ahead 
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caused by insufficient information.  “The company did not properly model the geology of the 
area and was unprepared for the effect of ice on the pipeline and environmental concerns.”84  
Sakhalin Energy Chief Executive, Ian Craig, also states that the company underestimated ice-
related working limitations during the operational setup of the platforms.  “Speed is greatly 
reduced by sea freeze in winter… and time is cost without detailing the overruns.” 85  
Consequently, according to Guyt, Sakhalin Energy’s pipeline manager, insufficient data led to a 
high-profile decision to reroute a subsea pipeline, leading to more overruns.  Following a late-
2003 survey, Sakhalin Energy announced in April 2004 that ice was formed even deeper into the 
seabed than previously expected and that, as a result, the pipeline would have to be buried to 
greater depth.  Guyt added that Sakhalin Energy had relied on old data that underestimated the 
depth.  The deeper burial implied the use of more powerful and expensive equipment.  In 
short, increased concerns about environmental issues significantly contributed to an expected 
delay in gas production.     
  
The chronic economic, social, and political backwardness of this region remain of concern to the 
development of future energy markets.  As Rozman notes, the region’s problems are nothing 
new, suffering as it does from five general negative aspects, tendencies that clearly hinder today’s 
further economic development.  These include: 
“Localism flirting with separatism, including threats to revive the short-lived Far Eastern 
Republic of the early 1920s; near domination by organized crime in a region already criminalized 
by Stalin’s labor camps; xenophobic paranoia about international conspiracies; dictatorship by 
local demagogues; and an economically inspired population exodus-an inviting vacuum for nearly 
overpopulated China.”86 
 
The economically depressed region represents only 4 percent of the Russian Duma seats but 
covers 36 percent of Russia’s territory.87  The substantial loss of federal support has further 
eroded what was once a relatively prosperous region.  Some skeptics still believe that the future 
of this region is not that bright and Moscow does not seem to pay enough attention.  Moreover, 
one might argue that the current Russian nationalism in the region, often seen in the form of 
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anti-Chinese rhetoric or fear of Asian dominance, may spoil the potential for energy cooperation 
with Northeast Asian nations.88  
 
Sixth, “supply infrastructure, technologies for utilization and supply, development of markets for 
gas products and services, and facilitating policies and regulations at both domestic and 
international levels are essential.”89  Development of local distribution networks is particularly 
crucial for natural gas markets to form and for projects to proceed.  However, efficient 
distribution networks are lacking in the region. 
 
There is no denying that both bilateral and multilateral energy cooperation within Northeast Asia 
have high potentials for bringing shared prosperity.  While taking advantage of the diverse 
energy profiles of each country based on economies of scale, they can advance the frontiers of 
cooperation in areas such as trans-boundary power interconnections, natural gas pipeline 
networks, joint use of existing supply infrastructure, transfer of technology and know-how, and 
joint exploration and development of energy resources.90   
 
Nevertheless, unlike most other regions including Europe, North and Latin America, Southeast 
Asia, even Africa, energy cooperation among Northeast Asian nations is a relatively new 
phenomenon mostly because there was no such discussion in the past.  Northeast Asia has no 
general economic or institutional agreements or unions like the European Union, ASEAN, 
OPEC, the European Energy Charter, or the ASEAN Council on Petroleum (ASCOPE).  Until 
recently, if there were any, they had still been developed on the basis of bilateral relations rather 
than a multilateral framework. 91   The political tensions, cultural, ethnic and institutional 
obstacles, as well as economic differences among the nations in Northeast Asia have often 
compelled each country to cope individually with their own energy problems while blocking the 
development of an effective regional system of energy security.92    
 
Some experts also suspect that the competing national goals for energy projects might lead to 
more tensions rather than cooperation.93  Moreover, in Northeast Asia, there are currently no 
                                                   
88
 Wuchte, p. 48. 
89
 APEC, p. 69 
90
 Ibid., p. 116. 
91
 Khartukov, p. 176. 
92
 Ibid. 
93
 Valencia, Mark J., and James P. Dorian, “Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast Asia’s Energy Sector: Possibilities 
and Problems,” Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Supply and Demand; Conflict and Cooperation, Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) Policy Paper 3, February, 1998, pp. 41-58.  
                Energy Security in Northeast Asia: Putin, Progress and Problems 
 
 
 
Please note that you are bound by our conditions of use http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/copyright.htm © LSE 2006 
 
Page 19 
common legal and institutional frameworks for energy collaboration.94  Only Russia and Japan 
have signed both the European Energy Charter and the Energy Charter Treaty95, and South 
Korea and Japan are the only members of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in this region.  
As previously discussed, energy security is still seen as quite vulnerable considering the 
complexity of the Northeast Asian political situation.  Northeast Asian countries do admit 
however that ongoing energy projects in the Russian Far East are likely to play a crucial role in 
integrating the Northeast Asian community and promoting regional energy cooperation.   
 
Nevertheless, they all fear possible overdependence on any single source of energy supplies at the 
same time.  For example, China is clearly concerned about the possibility of exclusive 
dependence on future supplies from Russia, whereas Japan has a similar concern about China.  
The majority of the considered projects are oriented to the Chinese market.  Russia also worries 
that China, as the monopoly consumer of Russian energy resources, will come to dictate its rules 
in the pricing of Russian energy resources.96  Once again, South Korea is afraid of possible 
disruptions in pipeline supplies through North Korea and China.  In short, Russian oil and gas 
may not be that likely to dominate Northeast Asia’s energy markets.97  Rather, it is highly likely 
that Russia will become ‘a key supplementary supplier’ able to counterbalance the traditional 
sources of Northeast Asian energy imports, which is mostly the Middle East at this moment.98  
 
Perhaps, in my opinion, one of the positive ways to look at energy security in the Russian Far 
East is to broach multilateral energy framework on the basis of the region’s energy importers and 
exporters, instead of focusing on either supply or demand side.99  The experience of the past 
suggests that any attempt to enhance energy security focusing on one side turns out to be 
unsustainable in the end.  On the contrary, multilateral cooperative frameworks involving both 
exporters and importers prove more advantageous100 because they reinforce stability and support 
economic development.  As Ivanov points out, the size of the market for natural gas in the 
Russian Far East is not particularly small, but at the same time it is not big enough to justify the 
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construction of the infrastructure for a major pipeline.  A more serious problem is that the multi 
billion dollar funds needed for such large-scale projects are simply not available either inside 
Russia or inside Korea.101  Therefore, it is necessary to diversify the export markets for Russian 
energy resources in Northeast Asia with the active involvement of China, Japan, the United 
States, two Koreas, and other nations, possibly Mongolia.  Specifically, as for the joint ventures 
for the pipeline project, it is vital to look for a way to take in those various joint venture 
agreements, and consolidate them in such a way that none of the participating countries or 
companies lose value in their ownership of these assets.  Then, such multilateral cooperation 
would link the region in an energy community and thus contribute to the process of regional 
integration.102  Finally, the issue of energy security in Northeast Asia is no longer only a regional 
concern but becomes more and more a global concern too.103   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has always wanted to become a pivotal regional 
player virtually everywhere its borders meet.  The Korean peninsula was no exception to this, 
although not quite as imperative as Russia’s western and southern fronts.  Putin’s Russia is 
clearly hoping to upgrade its prestige and influence on the Korean peninsula by promoting its 
role as an objective mediator and by creating a multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia.  
Although Russia has often been portrayed as a waning political and economic force to Koreans 
especially since the end of the Cold War, the country cannot be simply ignored in the “new 
geopolitics of energy” because of its enormous current energy production and export potential.104  
Simultaneously, considering that Russia’s economic growth depends both on its vast natural 
resources and their efficient use, Russia has the economic interest to expand its energy exporting 
market in Northeast Asia.  From the regional economic security perspective, Northeast Asian 
regional integration depends upon a certain degree of shared economic, political, and ideological 
interests before it can be successfully launched.  Specifically, economic interdependence is 
essential for regional security cooperation.  In this regard, the Kovykta and Sakhalin oil and gas 
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projects clearly provide Russia and Northeast Asian countries with a possible key to energy 
security.  From this point of view, it will be extremely interesting to observe the development of 
these two projects over the next several years. 
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